In dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, the household's labor margin as well as consumption margin affects Arrow-Pratt risk aversion. This paper derives simple, closed-form expressions for risk aversion that take into account the household's labor margin. Ignoring the labor margin can lead to wildly inaccurate measures of the household's true attitudes toward risk. We show that risk premia on assets computed using the stochastic discount factor are proportional to Arrow-Pratt risk aversion, so that measuring risk aversion correctly is crucial for understanding asset prices. Closed-form expressions for risk aversion in DSGE models with generalized recursive preferences and internal and external habits are also derived.
Introduction
In a static, one-period model with household utility u(·) defined over the quantity c of a single consumption good, Arrow (1964) and Pratt (1965) defined the coefficients of absolute and relative risk aversion, −u (c)/u (c) and −c u (c)/u (c). The former is the natural measure of household aversion to gambles over consumption units, and the latter the natural measure for gambles over a fraction of total household consumption.
Difficulties immediately arise, however, when one attempts to generalize these concepts from the case of a one-period, one-good model to the case of many periods or many goods (e.g., Kihlstrom and Mirman, 1974) . To measure risk aversion when multiple goods are present, Stiglitz (1969) proposed using the indirect utility function rather than the utility function itself. This reformulates the problem from measuring risk aversion with respect to multiple goods to measuring risk aversion with respect to a single good, wealth.
Then −v (a)/v (a) and −av (a)/v (a) are the natural measures of the household's absolute and relative risk aversion with respect to gambles over wealth, where v(·) denotes the household's indirect utility as a function of wealth a.
In the dynamic setting, Constantinides (1990) proposed measuring risk aversion using the household's value function, which again collapses the problem of measuring risk aversion with respect to an infinity of goods across time and states of nature into the much simpler problem of measuring risk aversion with respect to a single good, beginningof-period household wealth. Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (1997) apply Constantinides' definition to very simple endowment economy models for which they can derive closed-form expressions for the value function, and thereby compute risk aversion.
The present paper builds on Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (1997) by deriving Arrow-Pratt risk aversion for dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models in general. We show that risk aversion depends on the partial derivatives of the household's value function with respect to assets. Even though the value function typically cannot be computed in closed form, we nevertheless are able to derive closed-form expressions for risk aversion because derivatives of the household's value function are much easier to compute than the value function itself, by the envelope theorem. For example, in many DSGE models the derivative of the value function with respect to wealth equals the current-period marginal utility of consumption (Benveniste and Scheinkman, 1979) . Building on this insight allows us to compute simple, closed-form expressions for risk aversion.
The importance of measuring risk aversion in DSGE models has increased as researchers work to bring these models into closer agreement with asset prices (e.g., Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) , Tallarini (2000) , Swanson (2008, 2009) , Van Binsbergen, Fernandez-Villaverde, Koijen, and Rubio-Ramirez (2008) ). When matching asset prices, household risk aversion is a crucial parameter of the model-indeed, risk premia computed using the household's stochastic discount factor are proportional to Arrow-Pratt risk aversion, as we show in section 2. It is therefore surprising that so little attention has been paid to computing this coefficient accurately in DSGE models. The present paper aims to fill that void.
A central result of the paper is that risk aversion depends on both the household's consumption and labor margins. When faced with a stochastic shock to income or wealth, the household may absorb that shock either through changes in consumption, changes in hours worked, or some combination of the two. Measuring risk aversion without taking into account the household's labor margin, as is common in the DSGE literature, can lead to wildly inaccurate estimates of the household's true attitudes toward risk. For example, if the household's period utility kernel is given by u(c t , l t ) = c 1−γ t /(1−γ)−χl t , the quantity −c u 11 /u 1 = γ is often referred to as the household's coefficient of relative risk aversion, but the household is in fact risk neutral with respect to gambles over income or wealth-the proper measure of risk aversion-as we will show in section 2, below. More generally, when A corollary of this result is that risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution are not inverse to each other when the household's labor margin is nontrivial, even for the case of expected utility preferences. 1 There is a wedge between the two concepts that depends on the household's labor margin and how it interacts with consumption in household utility.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 works through the main ideas of the paper, deriving Arrow-Pratt risk aversion in DSGE models for the simplest case, time-separable expected utility preferences, and demonstrating the importance of risk aversion for asset pricing. Section 3 extends the analysis to the case of generalized recursive preferences (Epstein and Zin, 1989) , which have been the focus of much recent research at the boundary between macroeconomics and finance. Section 4 extends the analysis to the case of internal and external habits, two of the most common intertemporal nonseperabilities in preferences in both the macroeconomics and finance literatures. Section 5 discusses some general implications and concludes. An Appendix provides details of derivations that are outlined in the main text.
Time-Separable Expected Utility Preferences
To highlight the intuition in the paper, consider first the case where the household has additively time-separable expected utility preferences.
The Household's Optimization Problem and Value Function
The household seeks to maximize the expected present discounted value of utility flows:
subject to the sequence of asset accumulation equations:
and transversality condition:
where E t denotes the mathematical expectation conditional on the household's information set at the beginning of period t, β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the household's discount factor, c t ≥ 0 and l t ≥ 0 the household's choice of consumption and labor in period t, a t the household's beginning-of-period assets, and w t , r t , and d t denote the exogenous (to the household) real wage, interest rate, and transfer payments at time t. The function u is assumed to be increasing in its first argument, decreasing in its second, twice-differentiable, and concave.
Note that since u is increasing in consumption (i.e., there is no satiation), condition (3) will hold with equality at the optimum.
Let V (a t ; θ t ) denote the value function for the household's problem, where θ t denotes the vector of exogenous (to the household) state variables governing the processes for w t , r t , and d t . That is, V satisfies the Bellman equation:
where a t+1 is given by (2). Letting c * t ≡ c * (a t ; θ t ) and l * t ≡ l * (a t ; θ t ) denote the household's optimal choices of c t and l t as functions of the state a t and θ t , V can be written as:
where a *
Representative Household and Steady State Assumptions
So far we have considered the case of a single household, leaving the other households of the model and the production side of the economy unspecified. Implicitly, the other households and production sector jointly determine the processes for θ t , w t , r t , and d t in the DSGE model, and much of the analysis below does not to be any more specific about these processes than this. However, to move from general expressions for household risk aversion to concrete, closed-form expressions, we incorporate two standard assumptions from the DSGE literature.
2 First, we assume that the household described above is representative. This allows the variables w t and r t to be expressed in terms of derivatives of the household's own utility function u(·, ·) in equilibrium. {c, l, a, w, r, d , θ}, and we drop the subscript t to denote the steady-state value.
It is important to note that the nonstochastic steady state does not rule out the possibility that an individual household faces a hypothetical gamble of the types discussed below-the steady state of the model serves only as a reference point around which the aggregate variables w, r, d, and θ and the other households' choices of c, l, and a can be predicted with certainty. This reference point is important because it makes it much easier to compute closed-form expressions for many features of the model.
The Coefficient of Absolute Risk Aversion
The household's risk aversion at time t generally depends on the household's state vector at time t, (a t ; θ t ). Given this state, we consider the household's aversion to a hypothetical one-shot gamble in period t of the form:
where ε t+1 is a random variable with mean 0 and variance dσ 2 that represents the gamble.
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Following Arrow (1964) and Pratt (1965) , we can ask what one-time fee dμ the household would be willing to pay in period t in order to avoid the gamble. The quantity 2dμ/dσ 2 is the household's coefficient of absolute risk aversion, which we show in the Appendix is given by:
where V 1 and V 11 denote the first and second partial derivatives of V with respect to its first argument. Equation (7) is essentially the Constantinides (1990) definition of risk aversion, and has obvious similarities to Arrow (1964) and Pratt (1965) . Here, of course, 3 Dating the gamble t + 1 helps to clarify that its outcome is not in the household's information set at time t. 4 We defer discussion of relative risk aversion until the next subsection because defining total household wealth is complicated by the presence of human capital-that is, the household's labor income.
it is the curvature of the value function V with respect to assets that matters, rather than the curvature of the utility kernel u with respect to consumption.
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Deriving the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (7) is simple enough, but the problem with (7) is that closed-form expressions for V do not exist in general, even for the simplest DSGE models. This difficulty may help to explain the widespread popularity of "shortcut" appraoches to measuring risk aversion, notably −u 11 (c * t , l * t )/u 1 (c * t , l * t ), which has no clear relationship to (7) except in the one-good one-period case. Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (1997) derive closed-form solutions for V -and hence risk aversion-for some very simple endowment economy models, but these models all exclude labor. Their approach is thus a nonstarter for even the simplest DSGE models.
We solve this problem by observing that V 1 and V 11 often can be computed even when closed-form solutions for V cannot be. The case of V 1 is straightforward, following from the Benveniste-Scheinkman equation: 
All that remains is to find the derivatives ∂c * t /∂a t and ∂l * t /∂a t . We solve for ∂l * t /∂a t by differentiating the household's intratemporal optimality condition:
−u 2 (c 7 with respect to a t , and rearranging terms to yield:
where 
with respect to a t yields:
Substituting in for ∂l * t /∂a t gives:
Evaluating (15) at steady state, β = (1 + r) −1 , λ t = λ t+1 = λ, and the u ij cancel, giving: In other words, whatever the change in the household's consumption today, it must be the same as the expected change in consumption tomorrow, and the expected change in consumption at each future date t + k.
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The household's budget constraint is implied by asset accumulation equation (2) and transversality condition (3). Differentiating (2) with respect to a t , evaluating at steady state, and applying (3), (16), and (17) gives:
That is, the budget constraint implies that the expected present value of changes in consumption must equal the change in assets plus the expected present value of changes in labor income.
Combining (18) with (11), we can now solve for ∂c * t /∂a t :
In response to an increase in assets, the household raises consumption in every period by the extra asset income, r/(1 + r), adjusted downward by an amount 1 + wλ that takes into account the household's decrease in hours worked.
We are now in a position to compute the household's coefficient of absolute risk aversion. As shown in the Appendix, evaluating (7) at steady state yields:
Substituting (8), (9), (11), and (19) into (20), we have:
When there is no labor in the model-that is, u 12 = u 2 = 0 and w = 0-the household's coefficient of absolute risk aversion is just the traditional measure, −u 11 /u 1 , times the ratio r/(1 + r), which translates assets into current-period consumption. This observation 7 Note that this equality does not follow from the steady state assumption. For example, in a model with internal habits, which we will consider in Section 4, the individual household's optimal consumption response to a change in assets increases with time, even starting from steady state.
is actually quite remarkable: for any utility kernel u, the traditional, static measure of risk aversion is also the correct measure in the dynamic context (without labor). This is true regardless of whether u or the rest of the model is homothetic, and no matter what the functional form of V .
More generally, when household preferences include labor, risk aversion is less than the traditional measure by the factor 1 + wλ, which takes into account the household's ability to partially absorb shocks to income through changes in hours worked. When u 12 = 0, risk aversion is further attenuated or amplified depending on the sign and size of the interaction u 12 . As we show in the examples in Section 2.5, below, the household's ability to absorb shocks to income through changes in hours worked can have dramatic effects on the household's attitudes toward risk. We turn to these examples after first defining relative risk aversion.
The Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion
The difference between absolute and relative risk aversion is the size of the hypothetical gamble faced by the household. If the household faces a one-shot gamble of size A t in period t, that is:
or the household can pay a one-time fee A t dμ in period t to avoid this gamble, then the household's coefficient of risk aversion, 2dμ/dσ 2 , for this gamble is given by:
The natural definition of A t , considered by Arrow (1964) and Pratt (1965) , is the household's wealth at time t. In this case, the gamble in (22) is over a fraction of the household's wealth and (23) is referred to as the household's coefficient of relative risk aversion.
In the multiple-good, multi-period context of the present paper, household wealth is more difficult to define than in Arrow (1964) and Pratt (1965) . In particular, household wealth consists not just of financial assets a t and the present value of transfers d t , but also human wealth-the present value of the household's ability to generate labor income, w t l t .
Defining human wealth in the DSGE framework is not always straightforward, so we consequently define two measures of household wealth A t and hence two coefficients of relative risk aversion (23), which differ only in their definition of A t . When the household's time endowment is not well-defined in the model-as, for example, when the household's utility kernel is given by c
and no upper bound on l t is specifiedthen we define the household's total wealth A t to be the present discounted value of
Equivalently, A t equals financial assets a t plus the present discounted value of labor income w t l * t and transfers d t , which follows from the household's budget constraint (2) and (3). In steady state,
Under this definition of A t , the gamble in (22) is over a fraction of the household's lifetime consumption, and we refer to (23) as the household's consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion.
When the household's time endowmentl is well defined, then we can also consider an alternative definition of household wealth,Ã t , that incorporates leisure as well as goods consumption. In this case, we define the household's leisure-and-consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion by settingÃ t equal to the present discounted value of household leisure w t (l − l * t ) plus consumption c * t . From (2) and (3), this equals financial assets a t plus the present discounted value of the household's time endowment w tl and transfers d t . Thus, the only difference between the consumption-based and leisure-andconsumption-based measures of wealth is whether human capital is measured usingl or l * t . In steady state,
From (21) and (23), the household's consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion, evaluated at steady state, is:
while the leisure-and-consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by:
Of course, (24) and (25) 
Examples
Some simple examples illustrate how ignoring the household's labor margin can lead to wildly inaccurate measures of the household's true attitudes toward risk in a DSGE model.
Example 2.1. Consider the additively separable utility kernel:
where γ, χ, χ 0 > 0. The traditional measure of risk aversion for this utility kernel is −c u 11 /u 1 = γ, but the household's actual consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by (24):
The household's leisure-and-consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion (25) is not well defined in this example (the household's risk aversion can be made arbitrarily large or small just by varying the household's time endowmentl), so we focus only on the consumption-based measure (27).
In steady state, c ≈ wl, 8 so (27) can be written as:
Note that (28) is less than the traditional measure of risk aversion, γ, by a factor of 1 + γ/χ. Thus, if γ = 2 and χ = 1-parameter values that are well within the range of estimates in the literature-then the household's true risk aversion is less than the traditional measure by a factor of about three. If χ is very large, then the bias from using the traditional measure is small because household labor supply is essentially fixed.
However, as χ approaches 0, a common benchmark in the literature, the bias explodes and true risk aversion approaches zero-that is, the household becomes risk neutral. Intuitively, households with linear disutility of work are risk neutral with respect to gambles over wealth because they can completely offset those gambles at the margin by working more or fewer hours, and households with linear disutility of work are clearly risk neutral with respect to gambles over hours.
Expression (28) also helps to clarify several points. First, risk aversion in the model is a combination of both parameters γ and χ, reflecting that the household absorbs income gambles along both of its two margins, consumption and labor. Second, for any given γ, actual risk aversion in the model can lie anywhere between 0 and γ, depending on χ.
That is, having an additional margin with which to absorb income gambles reduces the household's aversion to risk. Third, (28) is symmetric in γ and χ, reflecting that labor and consumption enter essentially symmetrically into u in this example and play an essentially equal role in absorbing income shocks (equal, that is, before taking into account the importances γ and χ). Put differently, ignoring the labor margin in this example would be just as erroneous as ignoring the consumption margin.
Example 2.2. Consider the King-Plosser-Rebelo-type (1988) utility kernel:
where γ > 0, γ = 1, χ > 0, l t < 1, and χ(1 − γ) < γ for concavity. The traditional measure of risk aversion for (29) is γ, but the household's actual leisure-and-consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by:
Note that concavity of (29) implies that (30) is positive. As in the previous example, (30) depends on both γ and χ, and can lie anywhere between 0 and the traditional measure γ, depending on χ. In this example, risk aversion is less than the traditional measure by the amount χ(1 − γ). As χ approaches γ/(1 − γ)-that is, as utility approaches CobbDouglas-the household becomes risk neutral; in this case, household utility along the line c t = w t (1 − l t ) is linear, so the household finds it optimal to absorb shocks to wealth along that line.
The household's consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion is a bit more complicated than (30):
Again, (31) is a combination of the parameters γ and χ, and can lie anywhere between 0 and γ, depending on χ. Neither (30) nor (31) equals the traditional measure γ, except for the special case χ = 0.
Discussion
In the preceding sections, we showed that the labor margin has important implications for Arrow-Pratt risk aversion with respect to gambles over income or wealth. We now show that Arrow-Pratt risk aversion with respect to these gambles is the right concept for asset pricing.
Measuring Risk Aversion with V As Opposed to u
Some comparison of the expressions −V 11 /V 1 and −u 11 /u 1 helps to clarify why the former measure is the relevant one for pricing assets, such as stocks or bonds, in the model.
As described in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, and derived in detail in the Appendix, the expression −V 11 /V 1 is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of (absolute) risk aversion for gambles over income or wealth in period t. In contrast, the expression −u 11 /u 1 in a DSGE model is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of risk aversion for a hypothetical gamble in which the household is forced to consume in period t the outcome of the gamble.
Clearly, it is the former concept that corresponds to the stochastic payoffs of a standard asset, such as a stock or bond. When the household purchases such a security in period t, that security is resaleable in period t + 1 and the proceeds can be reinvested, saved at the risk-free rate, or consumed, as the household sees fit-that is, the proceeds contribute directly to the household's income or wealth in period t + 1. The household should thus evaluate those securities in the same way that it does the hypothetical gambles over income or wealth in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.
In order for −u 11 /u 1 to be the relevant measure for pricing a security, it is not enough that the security pay off in units of consumption in period t + 1. The household would additionally have to be prevented from adjusting its consumption and labor choices in period t + 1 in response to the security's payoffs, so that the household is forced to absorb those payoffs into period t + 1 consumption. Examples of such a security are difficult to imagine-all standard securities (such as stocks, bonds, options, etc.) correspond to gambles over income or wealth, for which the −V 11 /V 1 measure of risk aversion is the appropriate one.
Arrow-Pratt Risk Aversion and the Stochastic Discount Factor
Assets in a DSGE model are priced using the household's stochastic discount factor, which is tied to the household's marginal utility of consumption. One might then wonder, how does the labor margin enter into this equation? Here, we show the tight link between Arrow-Pratt risk aversion, the labor margin, and the stochastic discount factor.
Let m t denote the household's stochastic discount factor and p t the cum-dividend price at time t of a risky asset, with E t p t+1 normalized to unity. The difference between the risk-neutral price of the asset and its actual price:
measures the risk premium on the asset, where Cov t denotes the covariance conditional on information at time t, and dx 
conditional on information at time t. Equation (33) 
In the Appendix, we show that the household's Euler equation and budget constraint, together with (34), imply:
where Ψ 1 , Ψ 2 , and Ψ 3 are constants reported in the Appendix, and where
The first term in brackets describes the change in present value of household income, and thus the first line of (35) describes the income effect. The second line of (35) describes the substitution effect: changes in consumption due to changes in current and future interest rates and wages.
Substituting (34)- (35) into (33) yields:
Note that the term before the brackets in (36) is exactly the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion (times β). Comparing (36) to (32) shows the extremely tight link between Arrow-Pratt risk aversion and the risk premium on the asset: the latter equals the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion times the sum of covariances of the asset price with household assets, aggregate wages, and aggregate interest rates. This link should not be too surprising: Arrow-Pratt risk aversion describes the risk premium for very simple gambles over household income or wealth. Here we have shown that this risk aversion coefficient can also be derived through the standard stochastic discounting equation applied to gambles that may be correlated with aggregate variables such as interest rates and wages.
Generalized Recursive Preferences
We now turn to the case of generalized recursive preferences, as in Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) . The household's asset accumulation equation (2) and transversality condition (3) are the same as in Section 2, but now instead of maximizing (1), the household chooses c t and l t to maximize the recursive expression:
where α can be any real number. Note that (37) is the same as (4), but with the value function "twisted" and "untwisted" by the coefficient 1 − α. When α = 0, the preferences given by (37) reduce to the special case of expected utility.
If u ≥ 0 everywhere, then the proof of Theorem 3.1 in Epstein and Zin (1989) shows that there exists a solution V to (37) with V ≥ 0. If u ≤ 0 everywhere, then it is natural to let V ≤ 0 and reformulate the recursion as:
The proof in Epstein and Zin (1989) also demonstrates the existence of a solution V to (38) with V ≤ 0 in this case. 11 When u ≥ 0, higher values of α correspond to greater degrees of risk aversion, and when u ≤ 0, the opposite is true: higher values of α correspond to lesser degrees of risk aversion.
The main advantage of generalized recursive preferences (37) is that they allow for greater flexibility in modeling risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
In (37), the intertemporal elasticity of substitution over deterministic consumption paths is exactly the same as in (4), but the household's risk aversion to gambles can be amplified (or attenuated) by the additional parameter α.
10 Note that, traditionally, Epstein-Zin preferences over consumption streams have been written as:
but by setting V = V ρ and α = 1 − α/ρ, this can be seen to correspond to (37).
11 In this paper, we exclude the case where u is sometimes positive and sometimes negative, in order to avoid complications related to complex numbers.
Coefficients of Absolute and Relative Risk Aversion
We confront the household with the same hypothetical gamble as in (6). As shown in the Appendix, the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion for these preferences is given by:
As also shown in the Appendix, this simplifies to:
when evaluated at steady state. The first term in (40) is the same as the expected utility case (7). The second term in (40) reflects the amplification or attenuation of risk aversion from the additional curvature parameter α. Note that when α = 0, (40) reduces to (7).
When u ≥ 0 and hence V ≥ 0, higher values of α correspond to greater degrees of risk aversion, and when u and V ≤ 0, higher values of α correspond to lesser degrees of risk aversion.
Similarly, the household's coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by A t times (39), which, evaluated at steady state, simplifies to:
We define the household's total wealth A t , based on lifetime consumption or lifetime leisure and consumption, as in the previous section, and we refer to (41) as the consumptionbased coefficient of relative risk aversion or the leisure-and-consumption-based coeffcient of relative risk aversion, depending on the definition of A t .
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Expressions (40) and (41) highlight an important feature of risk aversion with generalized recursive preferences: it is not invariant with respect to level shifts of the utility 12 Note that, with generalized recursive preferences, the household's discount factor is given by:
, which must be used to compute household wealth. At steady state, however, this simplifies to the usual β.
kernel, except for the special case of expected utility (α = 0). That is, the utility kernel u(·, ·) and u(·, ·) + k, where k is a constant, lead to different household attitudes toward risk. The household's preferences are invariant, however, with respect to multiplicative shifts of the utility kernel.
When it comes to computing the risk aversion coefficients (40) and (41) 
and (41) as:
taking A = 1+r r c. Ignoring the household's labor margin biases both the first and second terms in (42) and (43). The bias in the first term is the same as for expected utility. Bias in the second term can arise from ignoring the presence of labor in steady-state utility, u(c, l). This is not to mention the bias from excluding the value of leisure in wealth if it is the household's leisure-and-consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion that is of interest.
Examples
Example 3.1. Consider the additively separable utility kernel:
with generalized recursive preferences and χ > 0, χ 0 > 0, and γ > 1, which was used by Rudebusch and Swanson (2009) to analyze the bond premium puzzle in a DSGE model.
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In this case, where u(·, ·) < 0, risk aversion is decreasing in α, and α < 0 corresponds to preferences that are more risk averse than expected utility.
13 For the technical reasons discussed above, we require u(·, ·) < 0; hence for simplicity we restrict attention here to the case γ > 1. The case γ ≤ 1 can be considered if we place restrictions on the domain of c t and l t such that u(·, ·) < 0 on that domain. One can always choose units for c t and l t in such a way that this doesn't represent much of a constraint in practice. Of course, one can also consider alternative utility kernels with γ ≤ 1 for which u(·, ·) > 0 holds.
In models without labor, preferences u(c t , l
, which we will refer to as the traditional measure.
14 However, when we take into account both the consumption and labor margins of the more general preferences (44), the household's consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion (43) is given instead by:
using c ≈ wl. As in Example 2.1, the household's leisure-and-consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion is not well defined in this example, so we restrict attention to the consumption-based measure (45).
As χ becomes large, household labor becomes less flexible and the bias from ignoring the labor margin shrinks to zero (that is, (45) approaches γ + α(1 − γ)). As χ approaches zero, (45) decreases to α(1 − γ)/γ, which is close to zero if we think of γ as being small
(not much greater than unity). Thus, for given values of γ and α, actual household risk aversion can lie anywhere between about zero and γ + α(1 − γ), depending on the value of χ.
Example 3.2. Van Binsbergen et al. (2008) and Backus, Routledge, and Zin (2008) consider generalized recursive preferences with u(c t , l t ) given by a Cobb-Douglas aggregate over consumption and leisure: (44) into (43). This is the case, for example, in Epstein and Zin (1989) and Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (1997) , which do not have labor. In models with variable labor, Rudebusch and Swanson (2009) refer to γ + α(1 − γ) as the quasi coefficient of relative risk aversion.
importance of the household's labor margin-to affect the household's attitudes toward risk.
Substituting (46) into (41), the household's consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion in this example is given by:
The latter agrees with the Van Binsbergen et al. (2008) measure of risk aversion, while the former is similar to (though not quite the same as) the Backus et al. (2008) measure. In this paper, we have provided the formal justification for both measures, (47) and (48). 
Internal and External Habits
Many studies in macroeconomics and finance assume that households derive utility not from consumption itself, but from consumption relative to some reference level, or habit stock. Habits, in turn, can have substantial effects on the household's attitudes toward risk, as discussed by Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (1997) .
In this section, we investigate how habits affect risk aversion in the DSGE framework.
We thus generalize the household's utility kernel in this section to the specification u(c t − h t , l t ), where h t denotes the household's reference level of consumption, or habits.
We focus on an additive rather than multiplicative role for habits because the implications for risk aversion are typically more interesting in the additive case.
If the habit stock h t is external to the household ("keeping up with the Joneses" utility), then the parameters that govern the process for h t can be incorporated into the exogenous state vector θ t , and the analysis proceeds much as in the previous sections.
However, if the habit stock h t is a function of the household's own past levels of consumption, then the state variables of the household's optimization problem must be augmented to include the state variables that govern h t . We consider each of these cases in turn.
15 Note that as ν decreases to zero, the ratio of wages to consumption becomes infinite and consumption becomes trivial to insure with variations in labor supply, which is why the consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion (47) approaches zero.
External Habits
When the household's reference consumption level h t in the utility kernel u(c t − h t , l t ) is external to the household, then the parameters that govern h t can be incorporated into the exogenous state vector θ t and the analysis of the previous sections can be carried over essentially as before. In particular, the coefficient of absolute risk aversion continues to be given by (7) in the case of expected utility and (39) in the case of generalized recursive preferences; the household's intratermporal optimality condition still implies:
where λ t is still given by (12), and the household's Euler equation still implies that, at the steady state:
Together with the household's budget constraint, it again follows that:
at the steady state, as before.
The only real differences that arise relative to the case without habits is, first, that the steady-state point at which the derivatives of u(·, ·) are evaluated is (c−h, l) rather than (c, l), and second, that relative risk aversion confronts the household with a hypothetical gamble over c rather than c − h, which has a tendency to make the household more risk averse for a given functional form u(·, ·), because the stakes are larger.
Example 4.1. Consider the case of expected utility with the additively separable utility kernel:
where γ, χ, χ 0 > 0. The traditional measure of risk aversion for this example is −cu 11 /u 1 = γc/(c − h), which exceeds γ by a factor that depends on the importance of habits relative to consumption. The household's consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by:
When labor is absent from the model (u 2 = 0 and w = 0), the consumption-based measure agrees with the traditional measure. When labor is present in the model, the household's consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion (54) is less than the traditional measure by the factor 1 + γc χ (c−h) , using wl ≈ c. Ignoring the labor margin in (54) thus leads to an even greater bias in the model with habits (h > 0) than in the model without habits (h = 0). If γ = 2, χ = 1, and h = .8c, then the household's true risk aversion is smaller than the traditional measure by a factor of more than ten.
When the household has generalized recursive preferences rather than expected utility preferences, the consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion for the utility kernel (53) is given by:
Again, the bias from ignoring the labor margin in (55) is even greater in the model with habits (h > 0) than without habits (h = 0).
Internal Habits
When habits are internal to the household, we must specify how the household's actions affect its future habits. In order to minimize notation and emphasize intuition, in the present section we focus on the case where habits are proportional to last period's consumption:
b ∈ (0, 1), and we assume the household has expected utility preferences. In the Appendix, we derive closed-form expressions for the more complicated case where the household has generalized recursive preferences and the habit stock evolves according to:
ρ ∈ (−1, 1), which allows for longer-memory habits.
With internal habits, the value of h t+1 depends on the household's choices in period t, so we write out the dependence of the household's value function on h t explicitly:
where c * t ≡ c * (a t , h t ; θ t ) and l * t ≡ l * (a t , h t ; θ t ) denote the household's optimal choices for consumption and labor in period t as functions of the household's state vector, and a * t+1
and h * t+1 denote the optimal stocks of assets and habits in period t + 1 that are implied by c * t and l * t ; that is, a *
The household's coefficient of absolute risk aversion can be derived in the same way as before, and results in the same basic expression:
However, computing the derivatives V 1 and V 11 is more complicated in the case of internal habits, because of the dynamic relationship between the household's current consumption and its future habits. We now turn to computing these derivatives.
The household's first-order conditions for (58) with respect to consumption and labor are given by:
Equation (61) is essentially the same as in the case without habits. The first-order condition (60), however, includes the future effect of consumption on habits in the second term on the right-hand side.
Differentiating (58) with respect to its first two arguments and applying the envelope theorem yields:
Equations (61) and (62) can be used to solve for V 1 in terms of current-period utility:
which states that the marginal value of wealth equals the marginal utility of working fewer hours.
16 This solves for V 1 .
To solve for V 11 , differentiate (64) with respect to a t to yield:
where we drop the arguments of the u ij to reduce notation. It now remains to solve for ∂c * t /∂a t and ∂l * t /∂a t , which we do in the same manner as before, except that the dynamics of internal habits will require us to solve for ∂c * τ /∂a t and ∂l * τ /∂a t for all dates τ ≥ t at the same time. To better keep track of these dynamics, we henceforth let a time subscript τ ≥ t denote a generic future date and reserve the subscript t to denote the date of the current period-the period in which the household faces the hypothetical one-shot gamble.
We solve for ∂l * τ /∂a t in terms of ∂c * τ /∂a t in much the same way as the case without habits. The household's intratemporal optimality condition ((60) combined with (61)) implies:
where F denotes the forward operator, that is F x τ ≡ E τ x τ +1 for any expression x dated τ .
Differentiating (67) with respect to a t yields:
where the u ij are evaluated at steady state, L denotes the lag operator-that is, Lx τ ≡ x τ −1 for any expression x dated τ -and we assume |βbwu 12 /(u 22 + wu 12 )| < 1 in order to 16 Using the marginal utility of labor is simpler than using the marginal utility of consumption in (64) because it avoids having to keep track of future habits and the value function next period. However, in steady state it is also true that V 1 = u 1 (1 − βb)/β, which we will use to express risk aversion in terms of u 1 and u 11 below. 
with respect to a t and evaluating at steady state yields:
Substituting (69) into (71) yields the following difference equation for c τ :
Since F L = 1, 17 equation (72) simplifies to:
which, from (71), also implies:
Equations (73) and (74) hold for all τ ≥ t, hence we can invert the (1 − βbF ) operator forward to get:
(
In other words, whatever the initial responses ∂c * t /∂a t and ∂l * t /∂a t are, we must have:
and E t ∂l * t+k
Because of habits, consumption responds only gradually to a surprise change in wealth, asymptoting over time to its new steady-state level. Labor, in contrast, moves immediately to its new steady-state level.
From (77), we can now solve (70) to get:
where
and where the latter equality follows because w = −(1 − βb) −1 u 2 /u 1 in steady state.
Note that equations (79)- (80) are essentially identical to (11)- (12) for the model without habits.
18 Again, λ must be positive if leisure and consumption are normal goods.
From the household's budget constraint and condition (78), we have:
which, from (78), (79), and (80) implies:
Without habits or labor, an increase in assets would cause consumption to rise by the amount of the income flow from the change in assets-the first term on the right-hand side of (82). The presence of habits attenuates this change by the amount βb in the numerator of the second term, and the consumption response is further attenuated by the household's change in hours worked, which is accounted for by the denominator of the second term in (82).
Substituting (64), (65), (79), (80), and (82) into (54) gives us the household's coefficient of absolute risk aversion:
18 Unlike in the model without habits, equations (79)- (80) 
with respect to a t to solve for V 11 using (77), (79), and (82).
and consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion:
Equations (83) and (84) have essentially the same form as the corresponding expressions in the model without habits.
Example 4.2. Consider the utility kernel of example 4.1:
where γ, χ, χ 0 > 0, but now with the habit stock h t = bc t−1 internal to the household rather than external. In thise case, the household's consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by:
where the last line uses β ≈ 1 and wl ≈ c.
The most striking feature of equation (86) is that it is independent of b, the importance of habits. This is in sharp contrast to the case where habits are external, where risk aversion is strongly increasing in b (cf. equation (49)).
Conclusions
This paper has shown that many studies in the macroeconomics, finance, and international finance literatures substantially overstate risk aversion in their models. The traditional measure of risk aversion, −cu 11 /u 1 , ignores the household's ability to partially offset shocks to income with changes in hours worked. For reasonable parameterizations in the literature, the traditional measure can easily overstate risk aversion by a factor of three or more.
Measuring risk aversion matters for understanding asset prices. Indeed, the risk premium on assets derived using the consumption-based stochastic discount factor is proportional to Arrow-Pratt risk aversion, as we showed above. If risk aversion is not measured correctly, then the risk premia on assets in the model are more likely to be surprising or puzzling. For example, some specifications of household preferences imply that the household is risk neutral-implying zero risk premia-even though the traditional measure of risk aversion is far from zero.
Another implication of the labor margin is that risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution are not inverses of each other, even for the case of expected utility preferences.
More generally, we have derived simple, closed-form expressions for Arrow-Pratt risk aversion in DSGE models. The class of models for which these solutions are valid is quite general and includes models with generalized recursive preferences and internal or external habits as well as models with time-separable expected utility preferences. These expressions, and the methods of the paper more generally, should be useful to researchers interested in pricing any asset-e.g., stocks, bonds, or futures, in foreign or domestic currencywithin the framework of dynamic equilibrium models. Since these models represent one of the main workhorses of research in academia, at central banks, and international financial institutions, the applicability of this paper's results should be widespread. 
Finally, ε t+1 is independent of θ t+1 and a * t+1 , evaluating the latter at σ = 0. Since ε t+1 has unit variance, (A7) reduces to:
Equating (A3) to (A8), the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion, 2dμ/dσ 2 , is:
The coefficient of relative risk aversion is computed similarly, except that instead of (A1), the hypothetical one-shot gamble is given by:
and, instead of (A2), the one-time fee is given by:
where A t is the size of the gamble (taken in the main text to be the household's total wealth by either of the two measures described there). Since A t is known at time t, it is trivial to modify the equations above to get the coefficient of relative risk aversion:
Recall that (A9) and (A12) are already evaluated at σ = 0, so to evaluate them at steady state, we simply set a t+1 = a and θ t+1 = θ to get:
and
Arrow-Pratt Risk Aversion and the Stochastic Discount Factor
As in the text, let m t denote the household's stochastic discount factor and p t the cum-dividend price at time t of a risky asset, with E t p t+1 normalized to unity. The difference between the risk-neutral price of the asset and its actual price:
conditional on information at time t.
gives, to first order:
at each time t. Differentiating the household's Euler equation and evaluating at steady state yields:
which, applying (A17), becomes:
Note that (A19) implies:
(1 + r t+i ). Differentiating the household's flow budget constraint, evaluating at steady state, and imposing the transversality condition yields, to first order:
Substituting (A17) 
The coefficient of relative risk aversion is:
Since (A31) and (A32) are already evaluated at σ = 0, to evaluate them at steady state, we simply set a t+1 = a, θ t+1 = θ, yielding:
and −AV 11 (a; θ) V 1 (a; θ) + α AV 1 (a; θ) V (a; θ) .
Internal Habits
We consider here the case of generalized recursive preferences:
and a longer-memory specification for habits:
with |ρ| < 1, and we assume ρ + b < 1 in order to ensure h < c. 
which, evaluated at steady state, simplifies to:
where h = bc/(1 − ρ) follows from (A36). It remains to compute V 1 and V 11 . As in the main text, these derivatives are more complicated to compute in the case of internal habits, due to the dynamic relationship between current consumption and future habits. The household's first-order conditions for (A35) with respect to consumption and labor are given by:
where we have dropped the arguments of u and V to reduce notation. Equations (A39) and (A40) are the same as in the main text except that the discounting of future periods involves the value function V when α = 0. Differentiating (A35) with respect to its first two arguments and applying the envelope theorem yields:
Consumption responds gradually to a surprise change in wealth, while labor moves immediately to its new steady-state level. From (A59), we can now solve (A51) to get: 
where the latter equaltiy follows because w = − 
which, from (A59), (A61), and (A62), implies:
Without habits or labor, an increase in assets would cause consumption to rise by the amount of the income flow from the change in assets-the first term on the right-hand side of (A64). The presence of habits attenuates this change by the amount βb/(1 − βρ) in the numerator of the second term, and the consumption response is further attenuated by the household's change in hours worked, which is accounted for by the denominator of the second term in (A64). Together, (A62) and (A64) allow us to compute the household's coefficient of absolute risk aversion (A38): 
Equations (A65) and (A66) have obvious similarities to the corresponding expressions without habits and with expected utility preferences.
20 In order to express (A65) in terms of u 1 and u 11 instead of u 2 and u 22 , we use V 1 = (1 − β(ρ + b))u 1 /(β (1 − βρ) ) and differentiate the first-order condition:
V 1 (a t , h t ; θ t ) = (1 + r t ) (1 − βbF (1 − βρF ) −1 ) u 1 (c * τ − h τ , l * τ ), with respect to a t to solve for V 11 .
